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Abstract—There has been an increased interest in the application of
convolutional neural networks for image based malware classification,
but the susceptibility of neural networks to adversarial examples allows
malicious actors to evade classifiers. Adversarial examples are usually
generated by adding small perturbations to the input that are unrecog-
nizable to humans, but the same approach is not effective with malware.
In general, these perturbations cause changes in the byte sequences that
change the initial functionality or result in un-executable binaries. We
present a generative model for executable adversarial malware examples
using obfuscation that achieves a high misclassification rate, up to
100% and 98% in white-box and black-box settings respectively, and
demonstrates transferability. We further evaluate the effectiveness of the
proposed method by reporting insignificant change in the evasion rate of
our adversarial examples against popular defense strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growth of the Internet, the number of malware has
been rapidly increasing. Machine learning has significantly improved
existing solutions in malware detection, classification, and network
intrusion detection and prevention. Static and dynamic analysis have
been the cornerstone of malware detection and classification, but
are increasingly being replaced by rule based and machine learning
models trained on features extracted from analysis, such as n-grams
[1]. This led to work, such as that of [2] and [3], in extracting richer
sets of features and representations directly from malware.
It has been proposed to use the image representation of malware as
input, allowing use of image processing and classification techniques
for malware classification [4]. Features extracted from malware images
were popularly used during a 2015 competition [5], resulting in
significant improvement for the top performing classifier [6]. The
methods proposed by [7] and [8] only used malware image features
and achieved high classification accuracy.
However, [9] found that neural networks are vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples. Adversarial examples are crafted by perturbing valid
inputs such that they are indistinguishable from the valid inputs when
viewed by humans but are confidently misclassified by a machine
learning classifier. As the concept of adversarial examples has mostly
been explored in the domain of natural images, interest has shifted
to further research and understanding of adversarial examples in the
malware domain [10], [11]. This immediately led us to question the
effectiveness of adversarial examples for image representations of
malware.
In this paper, we are interested in the application of machine learning
to malware classification and the effect that adversarial examples have
in this regard. Similar to adversarial examples in the natural image
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domain, an adversarial example of malware is an executable binary
file that is crafted from an existing malware sample with the purpose
of fooling a machine learning based classifier. However, adversarial
malware examples must also preserve the original functionality while
being executable. This paper presents a novel approach to creating
executable adversarial examples by minimally modifying malicious
raw binaries using a dynamic programming based insertion algorithm
that obfuscates the .text section of a binary with executable byte
sequences.
We report the misclassification rate of our adversarial malware
examples against popular machine learning classifiers. We also test
the effectiveness of the examples by strengthening the classifiers using
popular defensive techniques, adversarial training and distillation,
while comparing our proposed method with the current literature. We
also show that dummy code insertion patterns can be learned and
used as heuristics for obfuscation without use of machine learning
based approaches.
A. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We present a novel approach for generating adversarial malware
executables and obfuscation using malware images.
• We show transferability of our generated adversarial examples
to other classifiers.
• We evaluate the proposed method and related work against de-
fended neural networks using adversarial training and distillation.
• We compare obfuscation generated using the proposed method
to other common obfuscation techniques.
B. Organization
This paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a brief
background on malware classification and adversarial examples.
Section III describes the mechanisms used in the proposed method
for generating executable adversarial malware examples. Section
IV reports results under white-box and black-box settings. It also
reports the results after strengthening neural networks using adversarial
training and distillation. In Section V, we discuss interesting aspects
of the work, as well as possible extensions of the proposed method.
Section VI presents related work in adversarial example generation
for malware and obfuscation. We conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe the relevant background and malware
classification setup. We also discuss the nature of adversarial examples
in the malware image domain.
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A. Convolutional neural networks
Convolutional neural networks (CNN) are often the model of choice
when the input data contains spatial or temporal relationships, such
as pixels in an image or samples in a time series. The learnable filters
in a CNN are designed to explicitly capture the spatial or temporal
invariances in the data. This, combined with the layered representation
learning of deep neural networks allows CNN to effectively model
many different types of data.
A typical CNN consists of multiple convolutional layers with
pooling layers interspersed in between. The intuition behind this
architecture is that the layers learn specialized representations of the
input data for the task of interest.
CNN’s use in natural image classification has led to their use in
malware classification. In the following section, we discuss an image
representation of malware that can be used as input to a CNN.
B. Data representation
In this work, we represent Windows malware binaries as grayscale
images generated from the bytecode.
A whole malware binary is read into a 2-dimensional array as 8-bit
unsigned integers. Because each of these 8-bit unsigned integers are
between 0 and 255, they can be visualized as a grey-scale image
where 0 is black and 255 is white.
Previous work has shown that this image representation of malware
can be used to see shared repeated patterns and distinct characteristics
between binaries in the same class [4].
In this work, we used the Malimg dataset introduced in [4]. In
addition to the Malimg dataset, this work also uses the Microsoft
malware challenge dataset [5]. For this dataset, the width of the image
was fixed according to the recommended width for the largest malware
sample.
C. Adversarial examples & malware
The popularity of the image representation of malware has led to
increased usage of deep learning techniques for classifying malware
at high accuracies [12], [13].
Adversarial examples of malware images, generated using Fast
Gradient Signed Method (FGSM) or the Carlini and Wagner (C&W)
method can be used to evade classification [14], [15]. However,
adversarial malware examples must also be executable and have
the same effective program logic. A perturbation on a malware
image does not necessarily ensure these properties. For example,
let x = [137, 200], two pixels representing a binary sequence. When
converted to hexadecimal and then to x86 instructions, we get 89c8
and mov eax, ecx, respectively. Consider a small perturbation on the
image which results in x′ = [137, 201]. When x′ is converted into
assembly instructions, we get mov ecx, ecx, which does not produce
the same results as x.
1) Generating adversarial examples and noise: Adversarial exam-
ples are generally natural images, where a perturbation of the original
image causes it to be misclassified even though it appears to be a
copy of the original. We define adversarial examples and the methods
used to generate them below before introducing the proposed method
for generating executable adversarial examples.
Given an input binary file x, an adversarial example generated
using x is a perturbed version of x, x′, such that
x′ = x+ δ (1)
where δ is some additive perturbation, which causes a classifier to
incorrectly label the binary file while preserving the functionality of
the original file. x′ can be generated using various attack techniques.
In this work, we use the FGSM [14] and C&W attacks [15].
In a non-targeted attack as explained in Section III-A, the goal is
to cause misclassification. The task for the adversary is to generate
an l2-bounded perturbation of a binary x with true class y such that
||x′ − x||2<  (2)
where x′ is the modified binary, ||·||2 is the l2-norm, and x′ is
executable and preserves the functionality of x while having a l2
distance of less than a hyper-parameter .
In a targeted attack, Equation 2 still applies. The only additional
requirement is that the adversarial example is misclassified as a target
class y′ chosen by the adversary.
D. Defensive techniques
In this section, we provide a brief summary of the defensive
techniques against adversarial examples that will be used later to
assess our method’s effectiveness.
1) Adversarial training: Reference [16] showed that training on a
combination of discovered adversarial examples and clean examples
somewhat regularizes the neural network. The goal of adversarial
training is to learn to correctly classify future inputs that have
undergone adversarial perturbations. Reference [14] showed that
adversarial training on the MNIST dataset reduced the original
adversarial examples’ misclassification rates from 89.4% to 17.9%.
Adversarial examples generated using the adversarially trained model
had an evasion rate of 40.9%.
2) Distillation: Distillation was originally introduced by [17] as a
method to reduce the size of deep neural network architectures while
preserving knowledge acquired during training and extended by [18]
to defend against adversarial examples. Intuitively, neural network
distillation is the process of extracting class probability vectors from
a first deep neural network to train a second deep neural networks of
reduced dimensionality. This is based on the notion that knowledge
is encoded in a model’s output probability vector in addition to its
weights.
E. Obfuscation
The main goal of obfuscation is to make a program difficult to
understand while preserving the logic of the original program. In this
preliminary work, we focus on generating adversarial examples using
an obfuscation technique called dummy code insertion.
Dummy code insertion introduces code sequences that do not affect
the program logic. These sequences are named after the nop or no
operation. There are multiple ways to insert nops into a program, in
addition to simply inserting the nop instruction as seen in Figure 1.
These are called semantic nops and are instructions or sequences of
instructions that do not affect program logic.
Fig. 1: On the left, we have a simple assembly program that zeros out
the eax register before moving the hex numbers 45 and 20 into registers
eax and ecx, respectively. On the right, we have another program that
has the same functionality, but has a nop or no-operation code inserted.
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Fig. 2: This block diagram outlines the full proposed method for creating executable adversarial malware examples. The initial input is a malware
sample. Using the image representation of the input malware, adversarial noise is generated using FGSM or the C&W attack for a targeted or
untargeted attack. The adversarial noise is added to the malware image, which may or may not be executable or have the same functionality. The
output of this addition will be referenced to as the image adversarial example. The image adversarial example and the input malware are inputs to the
proposed AMAO obfuscation algorithm to generate an executable adversarial malware example. If the output of the algorithm does not evade a target
classifier, we repeat the procedure.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we will formally define our problem and threat
model. We also describe how the Fast Gradient Sign Method and
the Carlini & Wagner method can be applied to generate non-
executable adversarial examples from malware images. We introduce
a dynamic programming based algorithm, Adversarial Malware
Alignment Obfuscation (AMAO), to achieve this goal. A general
block diagram of the full method is given in Figure 2.
A. Threat model
In this section, we define the adversary’s goal, capabilities, and
attack surface.
1) Adversarial Goal: In this work, the goal of the adversary is to
generate malware samples that evade classification by deep neural
network classification models. In an untargeted attack, the adversary
adjusts the malware sample to be classified as any class but the true
class. In a targeted attack, the adversary adjusts the malware sample
to be classified as a chosen false class.
2) Adversarial Capabilities: The adversary does not have any
training phase capabilities, e.g, data injection and data modification,
and limits the attack surface to the testing phase. We consider two
separate types of adversaries, a white-box and a strict black-box
adversary. The white-box adversary has total knowledge about the
target model’s architecture, weights, training algorithm, and training
data distribution. The strict black-box adversary only has the ability to
collect input-output pairs (malware, class′) where class′ is the label
assigned the the sample by the target classifier.
B. Semantic nops
We compiled a list of 23 semantic nops that are used in the dynamic
programming algorithm introduced in Section III-C to create our
executable adversarial examples. The semantic nops are inserted into
a malware sample to create executable adversarial malware examples
using a dynamic programming algorithm.
C. Generating executable adversarial malware examples
The Adversarial Malware Alignment Obfuscation (AMAO) al-
gorithm follows a standard dynamic programming structure and
resembles string matching algorithms. The algorithm takes two binary
strings, B1 and B2, and a list of insertion points as inputs. The binary
string B1 has a length of n (in bits) and is the binary representation
of the non-executable adversarial example generated by a standard
adversarial example generation attack (such as C&W). B2 has length
m (in bits) and is the binary representation of the original malware
sample. Insertion points are address locations within B2 where an
insertion of a semantic nop would not split an existing opcode and
its operands. The goal of AMAO is to insert semantic nops at B2’s
insertion points such that B2 matches B1 as closely as possible. Note
that m < n as we are only interested in inserting semantic nops
in the original malware and are not modifying the non-executable
adversarial example. The output of the algorithm is an adversarial
malware example that follows the original sample’s program logic.
We define an n×m table O for memoization. O[i][j] is defined
as the minimum distance between B1[1 : i] and B2[1 : j] with B1[i]
matched with B2[j]. We observe that the following recurrence holds:
O[i][j] = min
{
O[i− 1][j − 1]
minCode
+D(B1[i], B2[j]) (3)
where
minCode = min
c∈Lnops
{O[i][j − len(c)− 1]+
D(B1[i− len(c) : i], c)} (4)
for some distance function D between binary strings and a list of
semantic nops Lnops. At each step, the algorithm chooses between
inserting a semantic nop and not inserting anything. We complete
our description of the algorithm by noting that the base cases are
trivial; O[i][1] for all i = 1 . . . n is equal to D(B1[i], B2[1]). After
the base cases are computed, we complete the rest of the table using
the sub-problem defined in Equation 3 and Algorithm 1. Note that
table O is lower triangular as we assume j ≥ i.
The distance metric was the sum over all bit differences, or
D(x1, x2) =
n∑
i=0
{
0 x1[i] = x2[i]
1 x1[i] 6= x2[i] (5)
where x1 and x2 are the adversarial example and malware sample,
respectively, read in as a binary string. The binary strings are assumed
to have the same length. In the case that x1 and x2 have different
lengths, we pad the front of the shorter binary string with 0’s.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Malware Alignment Obfuscation (AMAO)
Input: adversarial example B1, original malware B2, insertion
points Lins, nops list Lnops, distance function D(·, ·)
for i ∈ range(1, len(B1)) do
for j ∈ range(i, len(B2)) do
Calculate O[i][j] using Equation 3
end for
end for
At the completion of the algorithm, the optimal solution’s distance
from the adversarial example is located in O[n][m]. From this, we
can trace-back to the binary string that the optimal solution represents.
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Fig. 3: This is the architecture of a fully trained convolutional neural network that is used to generate adversarial noise. During the noise optimization
process, we begin with Gaussian noise added to valid inputs before adjusting that noise such that the now perturbed input is misclassified (as a
target class y′ if it was provided). The optimizer for the adversarial noise minimizes both the normal loss-measure and the l2-loss measure to cause
misclassification but to also bound the perturbation.
It is important to note that adding semantic nops is much easier
given the source code as the obfuscation can be added in the form of
LLVM bitcode [19]. Without the source, we rely on the analysis and
patching techniques laid out in [20] and [21].
D. Closed loop model
Because our method obfuscates a malware sample to match an
adversarial example as much as possible, it is possible that the output
executable may not fool the classifier. Thus, we propose a closed loop
model, in which we continue to train the adversarial noise until a 0%
classification accuracy is achieved.
Our initial adversarial examples are generated using the architecture
shown previously in Figure 3 with FGSM. Initially, the adversarial
noise is generalized over the test set and may not create adversarial
examples when added to a malware sample. In subsequent loops, we
begin to apply more computationally expensive adversarial example
generation algorithms by generating adversarial noise specific to each
malware sample and creating adversarial examples using the C&W
attack. The initial generalized approach reduces computational cost,
however, any adversarial example generation algorithm can be used
before input to the proposed AMAO algorithm.
E. Binary string distance metric
There are multiple choices for the closeness measure used between
the image adversarial example and the executable adversarial malware
example. We experimented with two measures, L2 and L0 distance. In
measuring the distance between two byte-sequences, the L2 distance
is the standard Euclidean distance between the image representations
of the two byte-sequences. The L0 distance counts how many bytes
differ between the two sequences. For example, let B1 = 0x9000 and
let B2 = 0x9100. The first bytes of B1 and B2 differ, resulting in
a distance of 1. Comparatively, the L2 distance is calculated using
pixel values and the distance between bytes 0x90 and 0x91 is shorter
than between bytes 0x90 and 0xFF. A distance metric using the L∞
norm was not considered due to its behavior in insertion problems.
This is because minimizing the maximum change to a byte between
two byte-sequences does not guarantee minimal insertions between
the two sequences. For example, let B1 from the previous example
be our goal sequence. This means that we will be inserting semantic
nops to B2 such that the distance between B1 and B2 is minimized.
Using the L∞ distance, consider the following cases. 1) B2 = 0x9090;
In this case the L∞ distance is 90. 2) B2 = 0x90908585; the L∞
distance is also 90. If 0x85 was a semantic nop, this byte can be
inserted to a sequence an infinite number of times without affecting
the distance.
Using the L2 distance resulted in executable malware examples
with a higher misclassification rate compared to those created using
the L0 distance. The L2 distance measure allows AMAO to minimize
perturbations to pixel values, which is the input to our target classifiers.
The L0 distance does not capture important differences between two
byte-sequences, i.e., given two semantic nops of the same length, the
L0 distance does not capture the difference between inserting one
semantic nop or the other.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we will outline and discuss the experimental results
of our method on different classifiers in a white-box and black-box
setting.
A. Dataset
We evaluated the effectiveness of our method using the Malimg
dataset [4] and the MMBIG dataset [5]. The Malimg dataset is already
in the necessary black and white image representation and contains 25
unique classes. We transformed the MMBIG dataset into the correct
format by parsing the given hex dumps. The MMBIG dataset consists
of 9 unique classes.
To compare against random obfuscation, We used random nop
insertion as there is no algorithmic approach to dummy code insertion,
to the best of our knowledge.
B. White-box setting
In this section, we consider the results of our method with access
to the classifier’s computational graph and weights.
ConvBlock
32 filters
ConvBlock
64 filters
FC + Dropout (0.5) FC + Softmax (24 classes)
ConvBlock ->  Convolutional + ReLU + Pooling
Fig. 4: This is the simple CNN architecture used in the white-box
experiments. The convolutional layers use a kernel size of 5, pool size
and stride of 2. The fully connected layer has 128 units and the dropout
layer use a rate of 0.5. The adversarial examples generated using this
CNN are also used to fool classifiers in a black box setting to demonstrate
transferability.
We trained a simple convolutional neural network, depicted in
Figure 4 to classify the Malimg dataset with a classification accuracy
of 90% on the training validation set. This translated to an 85%
accuracy rate on the test set. We optimized adversarial noise for each
of the 25 classes using the gradients of the trained model in a closed
loop, which consists of FGSM and C&W. In addition to the simple
convolutional neural network, we also trained LeNet5 [22] because it
was originally designed to be used with black and white characters
such as MNIST. LeNet5 was trained and achieved 92% classification
accuracy on the training validation set and 87% classification accuracy
on the test set. The same procedure was used to generate white-box
executable adversarial malware examples targeting LeNet5.
Our method was designed to terminate at a 0% accuracy rate, or
after some number k iterations. As expected, our generated adversarial
examples were all misclassified by the previously trained classifiers.
C. Black-box setting
There will always be cases when adversarial examples must be
crafted without uninhibited access to the model and its weights.
To evaluate or method in these circumstances, we first trained two
models on the Malimg dataset. 1.) The first is InceptionV3, which
is Google’s convolutional neural network architecture for image
recognition introduced in [23]. InceptionV3 was trained using transfer
learning to classify the Malimg dataset. 2.) The second is a gradient
boosted tree classifier, using XGBoost, based on top MMBIG Kaggle
competition submissions, using popular op-codes, the top 500 4-
grams, and features extracted from the image representations of the
malware [24]. We then fed the same adversarial examples generated
during our white-box setting attack, to these two classifiers without
any further optimization or alteration. We also repeat this process
against MalConv, a deep neural network classifier that takes raw byte
sequences as input [25].
TABLE I: Classification accuracies during the white-box and black-box
setting experiments when using different obfuscation methods before input.
We report accuracies using no obfuscation, one loop (AMAO1) of the
proposed method, the full proposed method (AMAOf), and randomly
inserted semantic nops. For the randomized insertions, we record the
range over 10 experiments. The top half of the table report results using
white-box attacks and the lower half report results using black-box attacks.
Model None AMAO1 AMAOf Random
Simple CNN 85.1% 44.4% 0.0% 20-30%
LeNet5 86.55% 46.0% 0.0% 20-30%
Boosted Trees 99.0% 1.98% 0.0% 80-85%
InceptionV3 86.1% 50.0% 26.95% 40-50%
MalConv 99.0% 57.89% 0.0% 80-90%
TABLE II: This table contains the classification accuracy of three
convolutional neural networks when classifying true malware binaries,
adversarial examples generated using [26], and our proposed method. To
keep the experiments consistent, we use the [5] dataset. We also generate
untargeted attacks using AMAO because the method proposed in [26] was
designed for a binary detection problem. Attacks on InceptionV3 were
black-box attacks while those on LeNet and Simple CNN were white-box.
Model and Data None Adversarial Training Distillation
Simple CNN & True 85.10% 84.40% 86.50%
Simple CNN & [27] 83.24% 83.90% 83.10%
Simple CNN & AMAO 6.50% 7.78% 7.45%
LeNet & True 86.55% 86.00% 87.20%
LeNet & [27] 85.40% 83.75% 85.43%
LeNet & AMAO 6.80% 8.19% 7.30%
InceptionV3 & True 88.45% 79.80% 89.10%
InceptionV3 & [27] 86.91% 65.0% 66.34%
InceptionV3 & AMAO 26.95% 6.20% 6.14%
D. Attack analysis
The results of both black-box and white-box experiments are given
in Table I. It is interesting to note that one loop of AMAO resulted in
malware samples of which only around 50% were able to successfully
fool the InceptionV3 and MalConv. However, the same samples were
much more effective against our boosted trees classifier, achieving
98% misclassification rate. Our method also consistently outperformed
randomized dummy code obfuscation.
It is also interesting to note that the initial highest performing
classifier is not necessarily the most robust against adversarial
examples. InceptionV3 was marginally better than our simple CNN
with respect to classification accuracy, but proved to be much more
robust against our executable adversarial examples, maintaining a 50%
and 27% classification accuracy against single-loop and full AMAO,
respectively.
E. Effectiveness against defense strategies
To further analyze the effectiveness of our proposed method,
we present experimental results of generated adversarial malware
examples against popular adversarial defense strategies in Table II.
We also compare our work with the payload method proposed by
[26].
We present the classification accuracies of a simple convolutional
neural network, LeNet, and InceptionV3 when classifying unob-
fuscated malware, adversarial malware examples generated using
the payload method, and adversarial malware examples generated
using AMAO. Each model attempted the classification task with no
defense, adversarial training, and defensive distillation. The accuracy
of classifying true data samples is also included to show that the
defense techniques are not overfitting to the adversarial examples.
The defenses were both done as a ”one time” retraining. Each
classifier was first trained on true samples before generating adversarial
examples to be used in the retraining phase. During retraining, each
classifier was trained until the validation accuracy reached the same
accuracy as for classifying true samples. We present the classification
accuracy on new adversarial examples that were generated against
the defended networks.
Interestingly, defensive distillation slightly increases the classifica-
tion accuracy of the true test set. The results show that distillation
increased the average classification accuracy of the true test set by
1% across the three classifiers.
The defense techniques were not able to significantly increase classi-
fication accuracy against attacks generated using AMAO. Surprisingly,
InceptionV3’s classification drastically dropped when it was trained
using adversarial training and distillation.
The payload method did not reduce any model’s classification
accuracy significantly. We believe that the addition of bytes to the end
of the malware binaries may work with deep neural networks with an
embedding layer, such as MalConv, but is not enough to affect image
classifiers [25].
We also attempted to experimentally compare our method with
the method proposed in [28]. A toy implementation of the proposed
method was tested. However, because this work creates adversarial
malware examples by perturbing bytes in the header, we did not
include these results as neither the Malimg dataset nor the Microsoft
malware challenge dataset contains complete headers. The toy
implementation was tested on randomly generated bytes acting as a
header to the existing data. Because we had no guarantees that the
toy implementation behaved on random byte sequences as the authors
intended, we omit these results. However, because of its similarity
to the payload method, we believe perturbing bytes in the header
only works for architectures similar to MalConv and not image based
classifies.
F. Comparisons to other obfuscation methods
In this section, we will begin with a brief overview of some other
obfuscation methods (found in [29] and the references therein) and
compare them to AMAO.
1) Subroutine reordering: In this type of obfuscation, the order in
which the subroutines appear in the executable are permuted. This
change does not alter the program logic as it does not affect the
execution of a program.
2) Mixing control flow: Control flow mixing relies heavily on the
jmp instruction to alter the code sequencing but preserve the original
behavior. The number of additional jmp instruction increases with the
number of lines that are permuted, leading to different signatures and
different memory mappings. Below is a simple example of control
flow mixing.
xor eax, eax 00 jmp short 16
mov eax, 0x45 05 mov eax, 0x45
mov ecx, 0x20 --> 0a mov ecx, 0x20
ret 0f jmp short 1d
16 xor eax, eax
1b jmp 05
1d ret
3) Instruction substitution: Instruction Substitution relies on the
fact that instructions can be executed in multiple ways. For example,
an XOR gate can be constructed in at least 4 ways. There are two
common ways to utilize this transformation.
a. Static value obfuscation The first is to obfuscate static values
that are assigned to variables or moved to registers. We can change
a mov instruction into a sequence of instructions that is logically
equivalent like shown in the example below.
mov eax, 0x45
mov eax, 0x12 --> add eax, 0x03
xor eax, 0x5a
The sequence on the right results in the same value in eax, but does
not immediately leak the value of 0x12.
b. Binary operators The second commonly used method is to
replace standard binary operators, such as addition and subtraction,
with more complicated, but equivalent, code sequences. For example,
a simple addition a = b+ c can be substituted with
r = rand()
a = b + r;
a = a + c;
a = a - r;
4) Obfuscation results: To test the effectiveness of the obfuscation
techniques in a real world setting, we apply obfuscation to the test
set given in the Microsoft malware challenge [5] and feed it to a
trained classifier. In this set of experiments, the top scoring submission
to the Microsoft malware challenge was used as the classifier. The
combination of features used in this classifier makes it more similar
to current malware detection and classification approaches.
Table III shows the classification accuracy of the model when fed
malware data that has undergone different obfuscation. All obfuscation,
other than AMAO, was applied randomly to the malware samples with
a fixed file size limit. The results show that instruction substitution,
subroutine reordering, and static value obfuscation do not significantly
TABLE III: This table compares accuracy scores of the top scoring
Microsoft malware challenge [5] model trained on the competition malware
training dataset and tested on malware data that has undergone different
obfuscation.
Obfuscation Classification Accuracy
No Obfuscation 98.62± 0.21%
Instruction Sub. 97.36%± 0.36%
Subroutine Reorder 98.45± 0.61%
Static Value Obf. 97.52± 0.29%
Dummy Code 87.98± 3.49%
Mixing Flow 39.46± 3.70%
AMAO 0.0%
reduce the classification accuracy of the classifier. Random dummy
code insertion results in 87.98% classification accuracy, an 11.3%
decrease in classification accuracy compared to the same model
classifying the original test set. Mixing control flow is most effective
out of the randomly inserted obfuscation with a 39.46% classification
accuracy. However, as shown in Table III and Section IV, AMAO
results in 0.0% classification accuracy. AMAO only uses dummy
code insertion, but still results in greater evasion rates than the other
obfuscation techniques. In Section V, we will further discuss the
patterns learned by AMAO.
5) A note on packers: Packers are the most popular obfuscation
technique currently used to evade real-world antivirus systems [30].
Packers use compression algorithms to obfuscate malicious code by
attempting to eliminate malign features. Typically, packed malware
will contain the compressed malware and a decryption engine that
will undo the compression at runtime. We experimented with packed
malware but the results were omitted because recent work has shown
that entropy, section hashing, and consistently executing graph mining
can be used to classify packed malware [31]–[33]. Being able to be
detected using entropy and hashing approaches leads us to believe
packing is not well-suited for use in adversarial example generation.
V. DISCUSSION
By using obfuscation, our method ensures the adversarial example
is executable. This makes our examples effective against dynamic
analysis as well as static analysis. A simple method to detect
adversarial examples given malware samples to classify would be to
run the sample in a sandbox environment to extract dynamic features.
If the sample does not run or does not behave maliciously before any
kind of termination, it can be categorized as an adversarial example or
a corrupted sample. To the best of our knowledge, AMAO is the first
proposed method to use obfuscation to create executable adversarial
examples. This allows AMAO to modify any section of a binary
file. Its resulting malware samples can also be used as input to other
detectors and classifiers because both static and dynamic features can
be extracted from it. We also believe that the addition of nop-like
system and API calls, such as time(), creates adversarial input to
non-image classification models, meaning the adversarial examples
cover multiple feature spaces, unlike other methods in the literature.
Another example would be to insert nops, affecting classifiers that
use n-grams as a feature.
Obfuscation is usually applied to binaries randomly or without
discretion because its goal is only to convolute the program’s
logic, hiding it from reverse engineers and analysis tools. However,
AMAO uses generated adversarial examples, which are created using
established methods, to generate obfuscation. Because the obfuscation
is designed according to adversarial examples, AMAO is much more
effective against classifiers than randomized obfuscation methods.
A. Learning to insert dummy code
We can further learn effective dummy code insertion from creating
executable adversarial malware examples using AMAO by extracting
learned patterns.
By outputting the decisions of the dynamic programming algorithm,
we can develop a heuristic for dummy code insertion. Specifically, for
each semantic nop in our vocabulary, we extract the frequency that it
is inserted over the set of all valid insertion points. The frequencies
of insertion can be separated by criteria such as attack target class,
specific semantic-nops, and the intersection of the two as can be seen
in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5: Obfuscation decision by AMAO was collected to create these three
graphs. Each graph shows the frequency a semantic nop was inserted at
each insertion point. Insertion points are locations in the binary where
instructions can be inserted without changing the program logic. Heuristics
can be developed using AMAO for general obfuscation or targeting specific
classes of malware, e.g. how to insert xchg ax, ax to target class 9.
VI. RELATED WORKS IN ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Reference [34] proposed generating adversarial examples of the
DREBIN Android malware dataset and claimed up to an 84%
misclassification rate. The DREBIN dataset, introduced in [35], is
a collection of features from static and dynamic analysis of the
Android malware. Similar to the work by Grosse, [36] proposed a
method to craft adversarial examples against RNNs, further building
upon the work of [18], which introduced an iterative algorithm to
generate adversarial examples and then extended their work to RNNs.
Reference [37] introduced MalGAN, a generative adversarial network
used to generate adversarial malware examples to fool black-box
machine learning models, and showed high evasion rates. MalGAN
currently uses API calls as features, but extending the method to
create executable adversarial malware examples would make it a more
dangerous tool necessitating increased research towards robust models.
Our approaches are similar in that they are both based around
perturbing an input X while limiting insertions of features to indices
in a set I , which contains locations where insertions will not destroying
the application’s functionality. However, unlike previous work, our
method inserts executable assembly code to the malware, ensuring
that binary is immediately executable instead of perturbing extracted
features.
After [25] first proposed detecting malware using sequences of raw
bytes with MalConv, [10] proposed a method to generate adversarial
examples while preserving functionality by injecting a payload of
byte sequences into unused sections in the middle or end of a file,
and claimed adversarial examples generated using FGSM might
not preserve the functionality of the file as the changes to the
embedding layer of their network architecture may have unwanted
effects on the functionality of the code. Our method circumvents this
by using an image representation of malware instead of the one-hot
representation used in [27]. Our method also is not limited to inserting
payloads or adversarial perturbations into non-executable sections as
our perturbations are in the form of already executable instructions.
This enables our method to also be effective against classifiers using
features such as API and system calls, as well as n-grams. We also
showed in Section IV that this payload method cannot evade image-
based classifiers such as LeNet and InceptionV3, however AMAO
evades classification by MalConv.
Reference [28] proposed a method to generate adversarial malware
examples by perturbing bytes in the malicious binary’s header. The
proposed attack uses feature attribution to identify important input
features to perturb. This proposed approach is similar to that of [27]
as they both perturb ”allowable” bytes. The payload method perturbs
bytes in the data sections or to padding at the end of the binary and
[28]’s method perturbs bytes in the header that are unimportant to the
header’s functionality. Because their similarities, header perturbations
suffer the same drawbacks as the payload method.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we introduced a novel method for generating
executable adversarial examples of malware samples. We designed
and used the Adversarial Malware Alignment Obfuscation algorithm
and showed, through our evaluation on the Malimg dataset, that we
were able to achieve high evasion rates in both white and black box
settings against state of the art image and malware classifiers. Our
method works by creating adversarial examples and then designing
obfuscation based off of those examples. To the best of our knowledge,
AMAO is the first proposed method to incorporate obfuscation
in creating executable adversarial malware examples. This allows
adversarial perturbation in any section of the malware while ensuring
its executability and persevering its functionality. Because AMAO
works with byte sequences, the resulting examples can be easily
converted to binary files from images. This means that our adversarial
examples can also be used against classifiers that use static and
dynamic features extracted using program analysis techniques.
We further showed the effectiveness of our proposed method
by evading deep neural network classifiers such as LeNet5 and
InceptionV3 with and without popular defense techniques, adversarial
training and distillation. In this defensive analysis, we compared the
proposed method with that of [26] and showed that our proposed
method achieved higher evasion rates against image-based classifiers
while also evading other classifiers such as MalConv.
This work also introduced an effective obfuscation algorithm to
evade classification to replace ad-hoc or randomized obfuscation.
By gathering information during the proposed adversarial example
generation algorithm, heuristics for obfuscating malware binaries
can be developed. Executable adversarial malware examples can be
generated by using the learned patterns as a guide for semantic nop
insertion.
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